The decision is made. The basis is not public.

«Based on an independent consultants’ study.»

That is how Prime Minister A. Kulbergs justified the government’s decision on 1 October. At a closed extraordinary meeting two days before the parliamentary election, the government set a cap: one kilometre of Rail Baltica track may not exceed €20 million. It covers track, electrification and signalling, but not «large structures». Until now a kilometre cost €28–32 million.

The next day RB Rail’s finance director O. Daugavietis told Latvian Radio two things. The company has not received the consultant’s report. And Latvia cannot change technical parameters unilaterally; they must be agreed by the Baltic states and the European Commission.

So the decision is made. The company building the line has not seen the document behind it. Neither has the public.

It is most likely the same review I have been asking for since 13 August. I have asked the ministry to confirm this.

On 10 June 2025 the Cabinet ordered an in-depth review of Rail Baltica. On 31 October 2025 state-owned Latvian Railways signed the contract with Alvarez & Marsal Infrastructure & Capital Projects. On 5 February 2026 the ministry took it over.

On 12 August the results were discussed at a closed session of the Rail Baltica thematic committee. The same day the ministry announced figures for the «Misa – Latvian/Lithuanian border» section:

These are significant figures. There was no calculation behind them, no author and no review they came from. So I asked.

I asked about the contract price and amount paid, and how 24.8 % and €108 m were calculated. I asked whether contractors helped prepare the measures and whether conflicts of interest were assessed. I also asked about noise barriers and the environmental assessment, the risk of EU (CEF) funding corrections, the freight forecast after 24 February 2022, the Daugava bridge structure, and which document told the Cabinet about €5.3 billion. According to the Saeima inquiry committee’s final report, the ministry knew of that figure in autumn 2021.

In each request I asked: if part of the information is restricted, release the rest and name the legal norm for each restriction.

On 21 September State Secretary A. Židkovs replied (letter No. 07-02/2818). On the review (my translation):

On when it might become available:

The ministry then turned to the requester. It cited the Supreme Court’s finding that abuse of rights is indicated by «the number of submissions, their frequency, repeated submissions with minor nuances». Its conclusion:

Instead, it pointed to edzl.lv, railbaltica.org, tapportals.mk.gov.lv and mk.gov.lv. Those sites do not answer the questions above. That is why they were asked.

Before the criticism, the ministry’s strongest case. It is a serious one.

The law allows restriction. The ministry may restrict access to a document. A court can review that decision. A refusal is not in itself a breach.

Negotiations are not over. RB Rail’s finance director said himself that parameters must be agreed with Lithuania, Estonia and the European Commission. Publishing Latvia’s scenarios and cost calculations before those talks could weaken its position. The ministry must still draw up a minimum project scenario by December. The decision process is ongoing.

33 questions is a lot. In six weeks it is a real workload for a small team.

The Treasury’s answer is correct. A consolidated report shows line items, not projects. That is methodology, not concealment.

Formally, the ministry can defend every step.

The problem is not that the ministry refused. The problem is how, and in what order.

A description of the requester instead of a legal basis. If a request is abusive, you cite a specific legal norm. «The number of submissions» is not a norm. Requesting information on public spending is a press function protected by Article 100 of the Constitution, the Press Law and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Asking more than a ministry can quickly answer is a capacity issue.

I said so on 22 September. If resources are short, set a reasonable extended deadline. To remove the argument that the questions were not about documents, I narrowed the request to six existing ones: the Alvarez & Marsal report in redacted form; the decision that restricted it; the contract price and amount paid; the 12 August minutes; the 2024 cost–benefit analysis; the Cabinet decision of 10 June 2025.

The money disappears between institutions. On 23 September the Treasury (letter No. 2026/8-5.19/905) confirmed:

They are included in the Ministry of Transport’s figures and the aggregate off-balance-sheet note KB.9.5. The detail, it says, is held by the ministry. So that same day I sent questions 30–33 to the ministry. No reply yet.

The Treasury points to the ministry. The ministry points to websites. The total liabilities of a multi-billion project get lost on the way.

The order is reversed. The ministry wrote that publication could harm the decision. So the decision comes first, and only then may the public learn what it rests on.

This is not the first time. I saw the same structural pattern in the airBaltic case. And the same pattern runs through Rail Baltica’s history.

I put in order what is already in public documents: the State Audit Office’s 2024 fact-finding review, decisions of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, and ministry reports.

• 2019. The ministry approves the Riga Central Station contract only for first-stage works matching available funding. The Cabinet does not review the contract or its changes.
• Autumn 2021. According to the Saeima inquiry committee, RB Rail informs the ministry that Latvia’s share could reach about €5.3 billion excluding inflation.
• 27.03.2023. The Prime Minister sets up an inter-ministerial committee on financing, not on project scope.
• 12.09.2023. The Cabinet orders a report on scope (23-TA-3176). The order comes from a government that has already resigned.
• 10.10.2023. The government allocates €18.2 million for design of four sections. The same day it reviews report 23-TA-1600. Its final version no longer contains the chapter on funding cost indexation from the state budget.
• 19.12.2023. The government backs the main-line contract worth €4.48 billion incl. VAT, but allows commitments of only €200 million for the first stage.
• 23.02.2024. A new committee is set up. Its remit includes scope and deadlines.
• 13.05.2024. Report 23-TA-3176 puts the full scope at €9.586 billion and the optimised scope to 2030 at €6.389 billion.
• 11.06.2024. The government decides each part of the project needs a separate Cabinet decision and no commitments are taken without funding cover.
• 12.06.2024. The State Audit Office publishes its review.
• 10.12.2024. The government takes its first, conditional, first-stage scope decision. The same day the Prosecutor General’s Office opens criminal proceedings over possible losses to the state budget. The case is not against specific persons. It was first investigated by KNAB, the anti-corruption bureau; since 6 May 2026 the case (No. 28120001724) has been investigated by the Prosecutor General’s Office’s State Security Protection Department.
• 10.03.2026. The government sets up two internal inquiry commissions: one on the Daugava bridge piers and the Mārupe viaduct, one on RB Rail’s switches procurement.
• 25.09.2026. The Prosecutor’s Office closes its review of RB Rail’s switches procurement: no breach of public procurement law. But only one bidder remained in the final stage, so the Ministry of Transport and Eiropas Dzelzceļa līnijas receive a prosecutor’s warning to check whether a cheaper offer is available before placing orders.

The Audit Office found that scope changes and costs were approved by the ministry and that the Cabinet was not always informed under a uniform approach. The review had no conclusions or recommendations, because the Audit Office established facts but did not assess their lawfulness.

Interpretation. The scope grew at the level of the ministry and the implementers. The government decided piece by piece. A single decision on what project Latvia can afford came in December 2024, a cost cap in October 2026. This is a systemic problem, not one minister’s mistake.

On 5 October I filed four requests: supplement 5 to the Ministry of Transport (questions 34–50: the cap’s calculation and method, consultant selection, what lies outside the cap, military mobility and the legal basis for the refusal), to the Cabinet (the 1 October decision), to the Ministry of Finance (fiscal rationale) and to the Treasury (borrowing plan and guarantees). I asked State Secretary A. Židkovs for an interview.

On 7 October I filed three more requests and a complaint to the Ombudsman:

• To the Cabinet. What was the deadline of the 12 September 2023 order and was it extended? The Prime Minister’s order 23-MPI-37. Who removed the indexation chapter from 23-TA-1600, and why? The full text of the 11 June 2024 decision. A list of restricted 2021–2022 documents. The 10 June 2025 decision on the Alvarez & Marsal review.
• To the Prosecutor’s Office. How did the June 2024 inquiry end? What stage is the December criminal case at? Has anyone been made a suspect (only «yes» or «no» and the number)? Has the case been widened? I am not asking for case files.
• To the Ministry of Transport, supplement 6 (questions 51–53): correspondence between Eiropas Dzelzceļa līnijas and the ministry in August–October 2023, and whether that information reached the government.
• To the Ombudsman, a complaint about how the ministry handles information requests. In both the Rail Baltica (21 September) and airBaltic (2 October) replies, the ministry applies the Law on Submissions, which does not cover information requests, and does not say how to appeal. In the airBaltic case it states that further similar submissions will be «taken into account» without reply. Both letters are signed by the State Secretary, who moves to another post on 19 October. So I asked the Ombudsman to make sure responsibility for the ministry’s decisions stays with the institution.

I agreed that all institutions may take longer than the statutory deadline.

The Prosecutor’s Office replied the next day, 8 October. Criminal case No. 28120001724 concerns possibly unlawful actions by state officials between 21 April 2017 and early 2024 in building the Riga Central Station and Riga Airport station infrastructure — possibly knowingly exceeding their powers and causing large-scale loss to the state budget. Since 6 May 2026 the investigation has been handled by the Prosecutor General’s Office’s State Security Protection Department, taking it over from KNAB. The investigation continues, and «no person has been granted procedural status with the right to a defence».

The office did not directly answer whether the case has been widened to other sites or whether the Saeima inquiry, State Audit Office and internal inquiry findings were used. It gives no further detail, citing investigative secrecy (Criminal Procedure Law, Article 375), and invites me to «follow the prosecutor’s announcements more closely».

It does not claim that information is being hidden deliberately, that any law has been broken, or that any specific person is to blame. The ministry may restrict access, and a court can review that. The criminal case is not against specific persons and its outcome is unknown. Some 2021–2022 documents are restricted, so the timeline for that period is incomplete.

Three questions for the new Saeima and government:

• Have you read the Alvarez & Marsal review? Do you support publishing a redacted version?
• What is the total of Rail Baltica liabilities on the state balance sheet, and where can it be seen?
• Is the project’s primary rationale today economic or defence? And which document says so?

Article 14 of the Freedom of Information Law requires a reply within 15 working days. For supplement 4 that means by 14 October. I asked for a reply to the interview request by 16 October. A refusal can be challenged and taken to the administrative court. I will update this article as replies arrive.

The ministry wrote that the review’s availability would be decided after government decisions.